TH, OV, NG, SH, MPD, TMA, SD


WILLIAM B. WALKER, M.D. HEALTH SERVICES DIRECTOR

RANDALL L. SAWYER CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OFFICER CONTRA COSTA

HEALTH SERVICES

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS

4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100 Martinez, California 94553-2233 Phone (925) 335-3200 Fax (925) 646-2073





COMPLAINT, INCIDENT, AND NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM

Type (Circle One): C 1 N	CASE NUMBER://-08-/3	-01			
Received Date: 8/13/16 Received Time:	Received By: The Lead:				
Incident Date:Incident Time: 125	Assigned to: Assigned Date:				
COMPLAINANT / REPORTING PARTY:					
Name:	Name: RP is from Facility Anonymous				
Organization: Sell Marke 7					
Primary Phone Number: 925 713 - 3060 Se					
Email:					
Address: Nacleeo					
City: Marhnez State: CQ Zip Code:					
FACILITY / LOCATION OF INCIDENT:	01.0				
Name: Same 175	CUPA Facility I.D.:				
Phone Number:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				
Address:Unit:					
City: State: Zip Code:					
City:	State: Zip Code:				
City: Location Description:	State:Zip Code:				
	State:Zip Code:	d			
Location Description:	level & report	<i>d</i>			
Location Description: INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: 5	level of reporte	ed			
Location Description: INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: INCIDENT TYPE / DESCRIPTION: Community Warning System Level (Community	Circle Highest Level): N/A 0 1 2 3 activa				
INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: INCIDENT TYPE / DESCRIPTION: Community Warning System Level (Community Warning System Level (C	Circle Highest Level): N/A 0 1 2 3 activa TRANSPORTATION MISCELLANEOUS □ Tank Truck □ Storm Drain/Creek	ed			
INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: INCIDENT TYPE / DESCRIPTION: Community Warning System Level (Community Warning System Level (C	Circle Highest Level): N/A 0 1 2 3 activa TRANSPORTATION Trank Truck Railroad Drug Lab				
INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: INCIDENT TYPE / DESCRIPTION: Community Warning System Level (Community Warning System Level (C	Circle Highest Level): N/A 0 1 2 3 activa TRANSPORTATION MISCELLANEOUS □ Tank Truck □ Storm Drain/Creek				
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INITIAL INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: INCIDENT TYPE / DESCRIPTION: Community Warning System Level (Community Warning System Level (C	Circle Highest Level): N/A 0 1 2 3 CC CIRCLE Hight Level): N/A 0 1 2 3				





AGENCIES ON SCENE OR NOTIFIED:

Agency Type	<u>Agency</u>	O/N	Contact Person	Phone Number	Case Number
Fire Department	CONFINE		Pete Marshall		
Law Enforcement					
Air District					
State OES) 	
Shell	Still		Lynley Horris	925 313-30	60

REPORT:

See attacled Typed Report for All Details. IR 16-08-13-01

August 13, 2016

On-call Team: TH, DV, NU, SH, MPD, TMA, SD

1258 hours: Shell reports Level 0 sulfur dioxide release. Shift super states no offsite consequences.

See attachment #4 for summary of event.

1337 hours: SO Dispatch reports numerous phone calls about a strong sulfur smell in the vicinity of Treat BLVD and Clayton Road. A couple of calls came in prior to this from the vicinity adjacent to the south of shell facility. Reported that Con Fire Engine Co. was pursuing odor.

Made contact with Con Fire's Pete Marshall (925 383-5049). He explained his Agency's efforts to locate to no avail.

Wind direction from Shell Martinez consistent with odor complaints.

6814 and private vehicles Dispatched to investigate and coordinate with ConFire.

1402 Hours: Hazmat Paged by 925 783-2465. This is private cell # of Lynley Harris of Shell Martinez. She reported a RQ of Sulfur Dioxide. Start 1223, stop 1249.

This is the point that the source of the Incident became clear and consistent with the odor complaints.

1402-1700 Hours: Hazmat continues to investigate and monitor, while coordinating with Dispatch, Con Fire, and the Facilities RTL Team.

1700 Hours: 6814 departed Shell Martinez for Hazmat. No additional odors detected or complaints from the public.

1800 hours: 6814 refurb complete and Specialist travel complete.

SEE ATTACHED:

- 1) Incident Form
- 2) OES Control #16-4943
- 3) Shell retraction of SO2 release. Dated 8-24-16
- 4) J-168 Flaring Event Tech Study. Dated 9-8-2016
- 5) Shell 30 day report letter. Dated 9-13-16
- 6) Request for billing.

Follow Up:

See attachment 3 "retraction of reported SO2 release"

Issues to Consider:

1) What is the interaction in the Facility thought process with regards to issuing a level (0,1,2,3) and the anticipated (yet to be calculated exactly) release amount in relation to the RQ?

- 2) In this case, 253 lbs. of SO2 caused significant complaints from the community. The RQ is 500 lbs. It appears that Facilities, in general, are using the threshold reporting criteria as the trigger for a level 0. This Incident was reported by Shell as a level 0, at which time they believed they had exceeded the RQ. If they knew it was so much less than the RQ would they have still activated the CWS?
- 3) Do the RQ's need to be reevaluated?
- 4) Does the CCC Hazmat Notification Policy need revision?




Hazardous Materials Spill Report: Cal OES Control #:16-4943 Warning Center to: ccchazmat

08/13/2016 01:46 PM

History:

This message has been forwarded.

Hazardous Materials Spill Report
DATE: 08/13/2016 RECEIVED BY Cal OES: Cal OES CNTRL #:16-4943 TIME: 1341 RECEIVED BY OSPR: NRC#:
1.a. PERSON NOTIFYING Cal OES 1. NAME: Lynley Harris 2. AGENCY: Shell Martinez Refinery 3. PHONE #: 925-783-2465 / 925-313-3777 4. EXT: 5. PAGER #:
1.b. PERSON REPORTING SPILL (If different from above): 1. NAME: 2. AGENCY: 3. PHONE #: 4. EXT: 5. PAGER #:
2. SUBSTANCE TYPE: a. SUBSTANCE: / b.QTY: / Amount / Measure / c. TYPE / d. OTHER / e. PIPELINE / f. Vessel Over => 300 tons 1. SOX / > / 500 / Lbs. / VAPOR / / No / No
2.
3.
g. DESCRIPTION: RP states that they believe that the refinery has exceeded the RQ of 500 lbs of SOX due to a flaring event. The refinery continues to operate. h. CONTAINED: Yes i. WATER INVOLVED: No j. WATERWAY: k. DRINKING WATER IMPACTED: No l. KNOWN IMPACT: None
3.a. INCIDENT LOCATION: 3485 Pacheco Blvd b. CITY: Martinez c. COUNTY: Contra Costa County d. ZIP:
4. INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: a. DATE: 8/13/2016 b. TIME(Military): 1223 c. SITE: Refinery d. CAUSE: Other Reason for Other: flaring e. INJURIES: No f. FATALITY: No g. EVACUATIONS: No h. CLEANUP BY: Unrecoverable e. INJURIES #: f. FATALS #: g. EVACS #:
5. SUSPECTED RESPONSIBLE PARTY: a. NAME: Lynley Harris b. AGENCY: Shell Martinez Refinery c. PHONE#: 925-783-2465 / 925-313-3777 d. EXT: e. MAIL ADDRESS: 3485 Pacheco Blvd f. CITY: Martinez g. STATE: CA h. ZIP:





| b. OTHER ON SCENE: a. ON SCENE:

c. OTHER NOTIFIED:d. ADMIN. AGENCY: Contra Costa County Health Services Department

e. SEC. AGENCY:

f. ADDITIONAL COUNTY: g. ADMIN. AGENCY:

h. NOTIFICATION LIST: DOG Unit: | RWQCB Unit:

AA/CUPA, DFG-OSPR, DTSC, RWQCB, US EPA, USFWS, AIR RESOURCES BD

CONFIDENTIAL REMARKS:

Created by Warning Center on 8/13/2016 1:41:38 PM Last Modified by Warning Center on 8/13/2016 1:45:37 PM

California State Warning Center Governor's Office Emergency Services Phone: (916) 845-8911 Warning.Center@oes.ca.gov

Link to Spill Report:

https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A w3.calema.ca.gov operation al_malhaz.nsf_SpillAllDocs_3B8A212FC30C45128825800E0071ACD1-3FOpenDocument&d=C wIBAg&c=VbbQuzWQQb42ogS3R1ZU_L1SLDEQBDhpr14-G3ChIcw&r=xdD7oupitUaubWHxd2cL708e a-OrhRgJZjanu0KhUCc&m=5pjr4yagV4zfYfBo4Yp0oN00HVp6O0gOd_7kyZQggOE&s=PytE 90AU4 vu42Z13FYjw zAhzuNc0NrleH2qRRxBqA&e=



Martinez Refinery
PO Box 711
Martinez CA 94553-0071
MECEIVED
AUG 262016
Contra Costa Health
Hazardous Materials

August 24, 2016

CERTIFIED MAIL-RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Contra Costa Health Services Department ATTENTION: Randall L. Sawyer Hazardous Materials Programs Director 4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100 Martinez, CA 94553

ATTENTION: Section 304 Reports
Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission (CEPRC)
Hazardous Materials Unit
3650 Schriever Avenue
Mather, CA 95655

RE: RETRACTION OF REPORTED SULFUR DIOXIDE RELEASE ON AUGUST 13, 2016

As required by section 2705(b) of Title 19 of the California Code of Regulations, the Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission and Contra Costa County's Hazardous Material Notification Policy, this is the written follow-up report regarding flaring at the Shell Oil Products US Martinez Refinery (Shell) on August 13 2016. The CR-ERNS Numbers are 1156156 for the National Response Center (NRC) and 16-4943 for the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal are-EMA).

An upset at the straight run hydrotreater caused it to vent to the flare to relieve pressure. Flaring began at 12:23 PM and continued for 28 minutes. Once flaring began, a possible exceedance of the 500 pound 24-hour reportable quantity (RQ) for sulfur dioxide was reported. Based on the measured flare volume and the flare gas H2S content, the actual SO2 released for this event was approximately 253 lbs. The RQ was not exceeded.

Please call Lynley Harris at (925) 313-3060 if you need additional information.

Singerely,

Gordon Johnson

Manager, Environmental Affairs

Shell Oil Products US – Martinez Refinery





J-168	Flaring	Incident
	and the second s	A RESIDENCE OF THE PROPERTY OF

Final

Level 1 Technical Study

Date: 9/8/2016

1.0 Summary of Event

At approximately 12:10 pm on August 13, 2016, an overhead pump at the straight run hydrotreater gasoline distillation column seized unexpectedly, causing the overhead accumulator to overfill liquid gasoline into the vent gas header and the vent gas compressor knock-out pot. The vent gas compressor tripped on a controlled protective function due to high liquid level in the knock-out pot and the vent gas line was subsequently flared for relief.

The spare overhead pump was started and levels returned to normal. The vent gas compressor was then restarted and flaring was stopped. The flaring lasted for approximately 26 minutes.


2.0 Impact

The pump trip caused a 26 minute flaring event and odor complaints from the surrounding community.

3.0 Process Background

The primary column (C-82) separates gasoline to diesel range hydrocarbons. The column overhead accumulator (V-424) stabilizes the column overhead liquid product by allowing vent gases to evolve to the 15# header before the liquid is pumped by overhead pumps P-2044 or P-2054 to a downstream process unit. The vent gas from the overhead accumulator is routed by the 15# header to the vent gas compressor knock-out pot (V-756) prior to being compressed through the vent gas compressor (J-168). The vent gas compressor has a controlled protective function to trip on high knock-out pot level to prevent liquid from going to the compressor. See process flow diagram below for details.

At approximately 12:21 pm J-168 tripped on a controlled protective function due to high liquid level in V-756. The increasing liquid level in the knock-out pot was caused by an overflow from the upstream overhead accumulator, V-424. The level in V-424 began to increase when overhead pump P-2054 tripped unexpectedly. At the time of the pump trip, the spare overhead pump (P-2044) was drained and blocked in due to a potential fugitive emission leak on a fitting of the seal flush tubing. After it was determined that the spare pump (P-2044) was safe to re-start, Operations started pump P-2044 and levels returned to normal.



Process Flow Diagram (PFD)





J-168 Flaring Incident	Final
Level 1 Technical Study	Date: 9/8/2016

4.0 Incident Timeline

The times referenced below are approximations based on a variety of information sources. All times are reported in 24 – hour format.

Date	Time	Description of Event	
	(24 hr)		
		P-2054 (Spare Pump) was overhauled. Scope included new	
5/31/16 - 6/14/16		pump shaft, mechanical seal repair, and bearing replacement.	
		All other components met dimensional specification.	
		P-2044 (Main Pump) was observed to have a potential fugitive	
8/2/16 - 8/7/16		emission leak on a fitting of the seal flush tubing. P-2044 was	
0/2/10 - 0///10		drained, and blocked in for maintenance. P-2054 was put	
		online.	
8/13/16	11:59	Air cooler (E-541) was put online to decrease process	
		temperature.	
8/13/16	12:10	Pump P-2054 tripped on high amps	
8/13/16	12:12	High Level Alarm in overhead accumulator V-424	
8/13/16	12:15	Attempted to restart P-2054	
8/13/16	12:18	High Level Alarm in J-168 knock-out pot (V-756)	
8/13/16	12:21	J-168 tripped on high knock-out pot level and the 15# vent gas	
8/13/10 12:21		header was sent to the flare for relief	
8/13/16	12:23	Flaring started	
8/13/16	12:25	P-2044 was lined up and restarted (after it was determined safe	
		to re-start)	
8/13/16	12:28	V-424 level drops and is no longer in alarm	
8/13/16	12:29	V-756 knock-out pot level was drained	
8/13/16	12:30	2 odor calls came in from neighbors	
8/13/16	12:43	J-168 was restarted	
8/13/16	12:49	Flaring stopped	

5.0 Causes of the Incident

The overhead pump (P-2054) tripped on high amps due to a resistance in the pump's forward rotation. The resistance to rotation was caused by friction between the impeller wear ring and the pump wear ring. The outer diameter of the impeller wear ring increased and touched off on the inner diameter of the pump case wear ring.

The pump's wear rings allow for small running clearances between the rotating impeller and stationary pump casing. The wear ring material is cast iron and is attached to the impeller by set screws. See photo below for reference. Cast iron is a common material in wear rings due to the material's resistance to galling.




J-168 Flaring Incident

Level 1 Technical Study

Final

Date: 9/8/2016





P-2054 Impeller and Fractured Wear Ring

The impeller wear ring was found to be fractured at the set screw locations, as seen in the picture above. The causes of this incident were deducted basis visual inspection of the fractured wear rings, pump overhaul history and process conditions around the time of the incident.

The cause of the fracture was likely due to an existing crack in the wear ring at a set screw location. It is likely that a process temperature change caused the existing crack to propagate and the wear ring fractured Approximately 10 minutes prior to the overhead pump trip, an upstream air cooler (E-541) was actively placed online to decrease process temperature. The process temperature was decreased about 30°F and was operating within temperature limits.

The initial crack in the wear ring was likely due to the fact that the wear ring had been subject to thermal stresses over the life of the wear ring. Stress from thermal fatigue on the wear ring could be caused by pump start-up and shut-down activities or thermal fatigue could be caused by heat that was applied to the impeller, as part of common maintenance practice, for impeller removal from the shaft during pump overhauls.

The overhead pump (P-2054) was rebuilt with the existing impellers and a new shaft during the June 2016 overhaul. The pumps wear rings satisfied dimensional checks and visual inspections during the pump rebuild, and thus the pump was returned to service. Wear rings are left in place when visually inspected, however, making it difficult to identify cracks at the inner diameter of a set screw location.



J-168 Flaring Incident Final Level 1 Technical Study Date: 9/8/2016

6.0 Recommendations

Recommendation	Responsible Manager or Individual	Estimated Completion
1. Non-destructively test (NDT) P-2054 pump wear rings during inspection after incident and determine whether wear rings are to be replaced with new.	CMD Shop Inspector	COMPLETED
2. Update P-2044 "Pump Inspection Work Scope Template" to include evaluation of cast iron wear rings for non-destructive testing or replacement with new	CMD Shop Inspector	3/30/2017
3. Update Mechanical Equipment Guidelines - 020 "Wear Rings in Centrifugal Pumps" to include verbiage regarding evaluation of cast iron set-screwed wear rings for NDT or to replace with new wear ring during pump inspection and repair.	Rotating Equipment Manager	3/30/2017