ATTACHMENT C
30 DAY FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM
CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES

INSTRUCTIONS: This report is to be submitted for all Level 2 and 3 incidents or when requested by CCHS. See Attachment B-1 for suggestions regarding the type of information to be included in the report. Attach additional sheets as necessary. Forward the completed form to:

ATTENTION: Adam Springer
Hazardous Materials Program Director
Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Programs
4585 Pacheco Boulevard, Suite 100
Martinez, CA 94553

INCIDENT DATE: 04/11/2023
INCIDENT TIME: 1654
FACILITY: Phillips 66 Rodeo Refinery

PERSON TO CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Drew Graham Phone number: (510) 245-5273

I. SUMMARY OF EVENT:

At approximately 1642 hours on April 11, 2023, the A-Turbine of the Rodeo Refinery Steam Power Plant tripped offline due to a high temperature reading. A Safety Instrumented System (SIS) shutdown occurred, as per design. This occurred as the C-Turbine was being shut down for scheduled planned maintenance and regulatory required inspection. The loss of the A-Turbine created a steam shortage. Due to the loss of steam, designated steam consumption equipment was shut down along with designated operating units.

As the refinery began the controlled shut-down of several process units to stabilize conditions, visible flaring started at approximately 1654 hours. Intermittent flaring occurred until approximately 0359 hours the following day. There were periods of visible emissions during the initial flaring period due to reduced steam supply. As a result of flaring, notifications were made to agencies and air monitoring was conducted in the communities adjacent to the refinery. All LEL, VOC, H2S, and CO readings were below detection limits or consistent with background readings.
II. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION RESULTS

Is the investigation of the incident complete at this time?  X  Yes  ______  No
If the answer is yes, complete the following:

III. SUMMARIZE INVESTIGATION RESULTS BELOW OR ATTACH COPY OF REPORT:

Incident Root Causes:

1. Local fuel gas pressure controller not responding adequately
   System pressure data indicates that the local fuel gas pressure controller for the SPP-A did not respond adequately to control the fuel gas pressure to that turbine, resulting in fuel gas pressure instability and flow swings

2. Deficient procedures
   The procedure for shutting down an SPP turbine does not clearly define how to position the SPP fuel gas system in preparation for a turbine shutdown, so that the two turbines remaining on-line are not overloaded during the transition from three turbines to two turbines.
IV. SUMMARIZE PREVENTATIVE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE INCLUDING MILESTONE AND COMPLETION DATES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

1. Revise SPP-NOP-0300 Turbine Shutdown procedure to improve pre-requisite guidance prior to shutting down an SPP turbine.

2. At the next planned shutdown for each turbine, perform preventive maintenance, calibration, and tuning of the Ranerex pressure controller. Correct any deficiencies.